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We present a model in which there is uncertainty about realization of a risky asset value for an informed trader. We 
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Then, we show that the informed trader in the wide state does not trade in equilibrium if the information that the 
informed trader with better information has is sufficiently accurate and the probability of the narrow state is 
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1. Introduction
Jones et al. (1994) suggested that future theoretical research needs to develop scenarios in
which (i) both the frequency and size of trades are endogenously determined, and yet (ii) the
size of trades has no information content beyond that contained in the number of transactions.
Ozsoylev and Takayama (2010) presented a model in which the size of trades is endogenously
determined. In this article, we present a model in which the frequency of trades is endoge-
nously determined. The contribution of this article is to propose a model of “no trade,” in
which an informed trader does not trade as an equilibrium outcome.
Milgrom and Stokey (1982) show that if there are no noise traders, and if the structure
by which traders acquire information is itself common knowledge, then even though some
traders may possess private information, the no-trade situation arises in equilibrium. In this
article, we propose a model such that even if there are noise traders and common knowledge is
assumed, an informed trader would not trade in equilibrium if the inside information that the
informed trader has is not sufficiently accurate. We develop the model within the framework
presented by Glosten and Milgrom (1985).
There are two changes that we will make to the Glosten–Milgrom model. First, we allow
the informed traders to not trade. Second, we assume that the informed trader has some
uncertainty about the terminal value of the risky asset. This creates a situation where the
market maker’s ask price is higher or the bid price is lower than the informed traders’ expected
asset value. Moreover, we consider the static version of the sequential trade model. In this
article, we focus on the situation where the informed trader does not trade in equilibrium.
When we assume that all the random variables such as the value of the asset, the probability
of informed trading, or the liquidity of the traders’ demand realizations are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) across all the periods, then each period is simply a replicate of
other periods. Thus, we focus on one period as a representative of many identical periods and
study the conditions under which there is a no-trade situation for the informed trader.
The model considers a market where a risky asset is traded between a market maker,
strategic traders, and liquidity traders. First, the market maker, who is not informed of the
risky asset payoff, quotes the bid and ask price. Then, either a strategic trader or a liquidity
trader arrives in the market in a random manner. The liquidity trader’s trading motive is not
related to the risky asset payoff at all, whereas the strategic trader has information on the risky
asset payoff. In the model, there are two states. In one state, called “the wide state”, the
informed trader has more coarse information about the terminal value of the asset, whereas
in the other state, “the narrow state”, the informed trader has better information. Then, we
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show that if the information that the informed trader with better information has is sufficiently
accurate and the probability of the narrow state is sufficiently high, the informed trader with
less accurate information does not trade in equilibrium.
In our model, the conditional variance of the asset with respect to the informed trader’s
information is higher in the wide state than in the narrow state. Therefore, we can interpret
our result in the following way. When the difference in information accuracy between the two
states is sufficiently large, the difference between the conditional variance in the two states is
also large. In this situation, when the probability of the wide state is very low, the prices are
set close to a true value. Then, the informed trader with more coarse information does not
trade in equilibrium.
The organization of our paper is as follows. The next section presents the model and the
equilibrium concept. In Section 3, we study the conditions under which the informed trader
does not trade, and present our results.
2. The Model of Trading
There are three classes of risk-neutral market participants: a competitive market maker,
an informed trader, and a liquidity trader. The game structure and the parameters of the joint
distribution of the investor’s state variables are common knowledge to all market participants.
In the beginning, the market maker posts bid and ask prices equal to the expected value of the
asset, conditional on the observed history of trades in equilibrium. The trader trades at those
prices, or possibly chooses not to trade.
As noted above, there are two states of the world. These states, “wide” and “narrow”,
are denoted by 푊 and 푁 , respectively. The wide state occurs with probability 휈 and the
narrow state occurs with probability 1 − 휈. The terminal value of the asset is represented by
푉 ∈ {0, 1}. Informed traders receive two signals, 휃, about the asset’s value, and 휏 , about the
state of the world. The signal 휃 has two values, low (퐿) and high (퐻), where the probability
that the signal is low is 1/2. Let 푝휏 ∈ (0, 1/2) for each 휏 ∈ {푁,푊} such that 푃푟(푉 =
1∣퐻, 휏) = 1/2 + 푝휏 in state 휏 and 푃푟(푉 = 0∣퐻, 휏) = 1/2 − 푝휏 in state 휏 . Furthermore,
푃푟(푉 = 1∣퐿, 휏) = 1/2 − 푝휏 in state 휏 and 푃푟(푉 = 0∣퐿, 휏) = 1/2 + 푝휏 in state 휏 . We
suppose that 푝푊 < 푝푁 . For the high signal, the conditional expected value of the asset is
1
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+ 푝휏 , and for the low signal it is 12 − 푝휏 . Thus, the conditional variance for the high signal is
(1/2+푝휏 )(1−1/2−푝휏 )2 +(1/2−푝휏 )(0−1/2−푝휏 )2 = 14−푝2휏 for each 휏 ∈ {푁,푊} and the
conditional variance for the low signal is (1/2−푝휏 )(1−1/2+푝휏 )2+(1/2+푝휏 )(0−1/2+푝휏 )2 =
1
4
− 푝2휏 for each 휏 ∈ {푁,푊}. Notice that in the wide state, the variance is larger than in the
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narrow state. In other words, in the narrow state, the probability of each signal is closer to
certainty than is the case in the wide state. In this sense, we can think of 푝휏 as the accuracy of
the informed trader’s information. The market maker and the liquidity trader share common
prior beliefs about the assets’ values with a mean 푉 ∗ = 1/2.
The probabilistic assumption about the states of the world can be interpreted as follows.
The informed trader’s knowledge of the terminal value of the asset is slightly better than that
of the market maker because that trader has “more accurate” information prior to the market
maker. However, the informed trader does not know the exact terminal value of that asset. In
the wide state, given a signal, the probability difference between the high and low values is
wider than would be the case for the narrow state. Therefore, we can say that in the wide state,
the informed trader has less accurate information than in the narrow state.
Let 퐸 = {−1, 0,+1}1 denote the set of possible trades available to the trader in each
period, with 푒 its generic element. That is, 푒 = +1 denotes a buy order, 푒 = −1 denotes a sell
order, and 푒 = 0 denotes no trade. Let Δ(퐸) denote the set of probability distributions on 퐸.
The market maker posts an ask price and a bid price. The trader can choose to buy the asset
at the ask price, or sell the asset at the bid price, or choose not to trade. Let 훼 be the ask price
posted and let 훽 be the bid price. Let 푝 ≡ (훼, 훽) ∈ [0, 1]2.
We consider the following game: with probability 휇, the informed trader will be chosen,
and with probability 1−휇, the liquidity trader will be chosen. If a trader is uninformed, his or
her demand is determined by the random variable 푄˜, which takes a value from 퐸. We assume
that 푃푟(푄 = 푒) = 훾푒 > 0 for every 푒 ∈ 퐸. We suppose that all the random variables are
mutually independent. The probability distribution is common knowledge to everybody in the
model. In this paper, we simply consider a static model.
The timing structure of the trading game is as follows.
1. At the beginning of the game, nature chooses the realization 푉 ∈ {0, 1} of the risky-
asset payoff 푉˜ and the type of trader 휃. The informed trader observes 휃.
2. At the end of the game, the realization 푉˜ is publicly disclosed, and consumption takes
place.
For each type of trader, a trading strategy specifies a probability distribution over trades with
respect to the ask and bid prices 푝. A strategy for the trader is defined as a function 휎 : 푃 →
1It might be interesting to consider the multiple-size setting. Although the main intuition of our result still
holds even in the multiple-size setting, it could complicate the analysis, and so we focus on the single-unit setting
to point out a simple intuition.
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Δ(퐸). Let 휎(푒∣푝) be the probability that 휎 assigns to action 푒 conditional on 푝. For simplicity
of notation we denote each type’s strategy by {휎휏휃,푒(푝)} for 휃 ∈ {퐻,퐿}, 휏 ∈ {푁,푊}, and
푒 ∈ 퐸. To avoid complication, we assume that when trading yields zero profit, the informed
trader would trade.
Now, we consider the market maker’s belief. Let 훿 ∈ Δ(Θ) denote the market maker’s
prior belief; that is, 훿(푒) denotes the market maker’s belief that the trader is the high type after
observing trade 푒. Then, the (Bayesian) market maker’s belief is updated through Bayes’ rule;
that is, for all 푒 ∈ 퐸:
훿(푒) := Pr(휃˜ = 퐻∣푒)
= Pr(휃˜ = 퐻) ⋅ 휇
∑
휏=푁,푊 휎
휏
퐻푒(푝)⋅푃푟(휏)+(1−휇)훾푒
휇
∑
휏=푁,푊
∑
휃∈Θ 푃푟(휏) Pr(휃)휎
휏
휃푒(푝)+(1−휇)훾푒
.
Definition 1 An informed trader’s strategy profile 휎∗ is optimal for price rule 푝 if it prescribes
a probability distribution 휎휏∗휃 over 퐸 for each 휃 ∈ {퐿,퐻} and 휏 ∈ {푁,푊} such that:
휎휏∗휃 (푝) ∈ arg max
휎∈Δ(퐸)
⎡⎣∑
푒∈퐸
∑
푣∈{0,1}
푃푟(푉 = 푣∣휃, 휏)휎휏휃푒(푝)(푣 − 푝)푒
⎤⎦ .
Definition 2 An equilibrium consists of the market maker’s prices, the informed traders’ trad-
ing strategies, and posterior belief such that:
(P1) the bid and ask prices satisfy the zero-profit condition, given the posterior belief;
(P2) 휎∗ is the informed traders’ optimal trading strategy for the price;
(B) the market maker’s belief satisfies Bayes’ rule.
3. No Trade in Equilibrium
Observe that Pr(휃˜ = 퐿∣ + 1) = 1− 훿(+1) and Pr(휃˜ = 퐿∣ − 1) = 1− 훿(−1). Therefore,
we obtain:
훼 =
∑
휏=푁,푊 Pr(휏) (Pr(푉 = 1∣퐻, 휏) ⋅ Pr(퐻∣푒 = +1) + Pr(푉 = 1∣퐿, 휏) ⋅ Pr(퐿∣푒 = +1))
=
∑
휏=푁,푊 Pr(휏)
(
(1
2
+ 푝휏 ) ⋅ 훿(+1) + (12 − 푝휏 ) ⋅ (1− 훿(+1))
)
=
∑
휏=푁,푊 Pr(휏)
(
1
2
− 푝휏 + 2푝휏 ⋅ 훿(+1)
)
;
훽 =
∑
휏=푁,푊 Pr(휏) (Pr(푉 = 1∣퐻, 휏) ⋅ Pr(퐻∣푒 = −1) + Pr(푉 = 1∣퐿, 휏) ⋅ Pr(퐿∣푒 = −1))
=
∑
휏=푁,푊 Pr(휏)
(
(1
2
+ 푝휏 ) ⋅ 훿(−1) + (12 − 푝휏 ) ⋅ (1− 훿(−1))
)
=
∑
휏=푁,푊 Pr(휏)
(
1
2
− 푝휏 + 2푝휏 ⋅ 훿(−1)
)
.
(1)
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The expected value of the asset is: 1
2
+ 푝휏 for the high type and 12 − 푝휏 for the low type
for each 휏 ∈ {푁,푊}. The informed trader buys if his expected value is greater than 훼 and
sells if it is smaller than 훽. We can see that the high type in the narrow state always buys and
the low type in the narrow state always sells, because from (1) ask and bid prices are convex
combinations of those four expected values of the asset. The following proposition provides a
formal statement.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the high type informed trader always buys and the low type
always sells in the narrow state.
Proof of Proposition 1: As the argument is symmetric, we will only prove the statement
for the high-type informed trader. The high type informed trader buys if 훼 ≤ 1
2
+ 푝푁 , and,
similarly to the above, we obtain the following condition:
푝푁 > (휈푝푊 + (1− 휈)푝푁) ⋅ 1/2 ⋅ 휇(1− 휈)
(1− 휇)훾+1 + 1/2 ⋅ 휇(1− 휈) . (2)
Note that 푝푁 > (휈푝푊+(1−휈)푝푁) as 푝푁 > 푝푊 by assumption, and also 1/2⋅휇(1−휈)(1−휇)훾+1+1/2⋅휇(1−휈) <
1. Therefore, (2) always holds. Therefore, we can conclude that the high type informed trader
in the narrow state buys. This completes our proof.
Thus if there is any possibility of no trade, it must be in the wide state. Now focus on the
wide state and notice that if the high type in the wide state sells, then the low type must also
sell, and if the low type in the wide state buys, then the high type must also buy. Therefore, if
there is no trade from the informed trader, it must be one of the following three cases: in the
wide state,
Case 1. the high type and the low type do not trade – this situation arises if and only if 훼 >
1
2
+ 푝푊 and 훽 < 12 − 푝푊 ;
Case 2. the high type does not trade and the low type sells – this situation arises if and only
if 훼 > 1
2
+ 푝푊 and 훽 ≥ 12 − 푝푊 ;
Case 3. the high type buys and the low type does not trade – this situation arises if and only
if 훼 ≤ 1
2
+ 푝푊 and 훽 < 12 − 푝푊 .
We start with Case 1. If 휎푁퐻,+1 = 1, 휎푊퐻,0 = 1, 휎푁퐿,−1 = 1, and 휎푊퐿,0 = 1, then we obtain:
훿(+1) = Pr(휃˜ = 퐻∣+ 1) = 1
2
⋅ (1−휇)훾+1+휇(1−휈)
(1−휇)훾+1+1/2⋅휇(1−휈) ;
훿(−1) = Pr(휃˜ = 퐻∣ − 1) = 1
2
⋅ (1−휇)훾−1
(1−휇)훾−1+1/2⋅휇(1−휈) .
(3)
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By substituting (3) into (1) and then simplifying the two conditions 훼 > 1
2
+ 푝푊 and
훽 < 1
2
− 푝푊 , we obtain:∑
휏=푁,푊 푃푟(휏) ⋅
(
−푝휏 + 푝휏 ⋅ (1−휇)훾+1+휇(1−휈)(1−휇)훾+1+1/2⋅휇(1−휈)
)
> 푝푊 ;∑
휏=푁,푊 푃푟(휏) ⋅
(
−푝휏 + 푝휏 ⋅ (1−휇)훾−1(1−휇)훾−1+1/2⋅휇(1−휈)
)
< −푝푊 .
(4)
In the end, we obtain:
푝푊 < (휈푝푊 + (1− 휈)푝푁) ⋅ 1/2 ⋅ 휇(1− 휈)
(1− 휇)훾+1 + 1/2 ⋅ 휇(1− 휈) (5)
−푝푊 > −(휈푝푊 + (1− 휈)푝푁) ⋅ 1/2 ⋅ 휇(1− 휈)
(1− 휇)훾−1 + 1/2 ⋅ 휇(1− 휈) . (6)
Therefore we can say: Case 1 arises if (5) and (6) hold. Note that 푝푊 < (휈푝푊+(1−휈)푝푁),
and as 1/2⋅휇(1−휈)
(1−휇)훾+1+1/2⋅휇(1−휈) < 1, the condition (5) does not always hold. Whether it holds
depends on 푝푁 , 푝푊 , 훾+1, or 휈. If 푝푁 is close to 12 , 푝푊 is close to 0, and 휈 is low, then the
informed trader’s information is accurate with very high probability. Therefore, the prices are
set very close to 0 or 1. Thus, the informed trader who has less accurate information would
not trade. In other words, the informed trader does not trade in the wide state. This is true
for both the buy and the sell sides. The symmetry of the conditions (5) and (6) gives us the
following result.
Proposition 2 Neither type of informed trader trades in the wide state if and only if 푝푊 <
(휈푝푊 + (1− 휈)푝푁) ⋅ 1/2⋅휇(1−휈)(1−휇) max{훾+1,훾−1}+1/2⋅휇(1−휈) .
Proof of Proposition 2: By Proposition 2, the informed trader in the wide state does not trade
if (5) and (6) both hold. The condition (6) can be rewritten as: 푝푊 < (휈푝푊 + (1 − 휈)푝푁) ⋅
1/2⋅휇(1−휈)
(1−휇)훾−1+1/2⋅휇(1−휈) . Therefore, we can say that the informed trader in the wide state does not
trade if 푝푊 < (휈푝푊 + (1 − 휈)푝푁) ⋅ min{ 1/2⋅휇(1−휈)(1−휇)훾+1+1/2⋅휇(1−휈) ,
1/2⋅휇(1−휈)
(1−휇)훾−1+1/2⋅휇(1−휈)}. This gives
us the desired result.
Notice that the conditional variance is higher in the wide state than in the narrow state
because 1
4
− 푝2푊 > 14 − 푝2푁 . The difference between the two is 푝2푁 − 푝2푊 . When 푝푁 is close
to 1
2
and 푝푊 is close to 0, 푝2푁 − 푝2푊 is close to its supremum. This allows us to say that when
the difference between the conditional variances is large with respect to the informed trader’s
information and the probability that the narrow state is sufficiently high, then the informed
trader in the wide state does not trade.
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It is worth mentioning the relationship between the no-trade situation and the probability
of informed trading (휇). If 휇 is sufficiently high, then 1/2⋅휇(1−휈)
(1−휇) max{훾+1,훾−1}+1/2⋅휇(1−휈) is also
close to 1. Therefore, the possibility of no trade increases because 푝푊 < (휈푝푊 + (1 −
휈)푝푁) ⋅ 1/2⋅휇(1−휈)(1−휇) max{훾+1,훾−1}+1/2×휇(1−휈) would hold for a wider range of 푝푊 . This is because if
the probability of informed trading is higher, the prices more accurately reflect true values.
Therefore, the ask price is set higher and the bid price is set lower. Hence, the informed trader
who has more coarse information would not trade.
Finally, we consider the other two cases. Notice that when 훾+1 = 훾−1, (5) holds if and
only if (6) holds. Thus if the informed trader does not trade in equilibrium when 훾+1 = 훾−1,
only Case 1 could arise. It might be interesting to see how asymmetry of liquidity distribution
relates to the no-trade situation. Since the argument is symmetric, we only consider Case 2.
If 휎푁퐻,+1 = 1, 휎
푊
퐻,0 = 1, 휎
푁
퐿,−1 = 휎
푊
퐿,−1 = 1, then we obtain:
훿(+1) = Pr(휃˜ = 퐻∣+ 1) = 1
2
⋅ (1−휇)훾+1+휇(1−휈)
(1−휇)훾+1+1/2⋅휇(1−휈) ;
훿(−1) = Pr(휃˜ = 퐻∣ − 1) = 1
2
⋅ (1−휇)훾−1
(1−휇)훾−1+1/2⋅휇 .
(7)
Similarly with Case 1 we obtain:
푝푊 < (휈푝푊 + (1− 휈)푝푁) ⋅ 1/2⋅휇(1−휈)(1−휇)훾+1+1/2⋅휇(1−휈) ;
−푝푊 ≤ −(휈푝푊 + (1− 휈)푝푁) ⋅ 1/2⋅휇(1−휇)훾−1+1/2⋅휇 .
(8)
By using a similar argument for Case 3 we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 In the wide state, the high type does not trade and the low type sells if and only
if the following holds:
1/2 ⋅ 휇(1− 휈)
(1− 휇)훾+1 + 1/2 ⋅ 휇(1− 휈) >
푝푊
휈푝푊 + (1− 휈)푝푁 ≥
1/2 ⋅ 휇
(1− 휇)훾−1 + 1/2 ⋅ 휇.
On the other hand, the high type buys and the low type does not trade if and only if the
following holds:
1/2 ⋅ 휇(1− 휈)
(1− 휇)훾−1 + 1/2 ⋅ 휇(1− 휈) >
푝푊
휈푝푊 + (1− 휈)푝푁 ≥
1/2 ⋅ 휇
(1− 휇)훾+1 + 1/2 ⋅ 휇.
Note that all the terms in Proposition 3 are strictly smaller than 1. A similar intuition to
Proposition 2 holds here. In addition, if 푝푁 is close to 12 , 푝푊 is close to 0, 휈 is low, 휇 is
close to 1, and (1− 휈)훾−1 > 훾+1, then the informed trader’s information is accurate with very
high probability and the buy order would be coming from the high type informed trader in
the narrow state. Therefore, the ask price is set very close to 1. Thus, the high type informed
trader in the wide state would not trade, whereas asymmetric distribution of liquidity trade
makes space for the low type to sell.
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